Both the artist and the scientist deal with the concept denoted by ‘world.’ For our general arguments we must not rely on any particular notion of the world, such as whether it is experimentally determinable or Hinduistic, completely subjective or completely objective, or anywhere in between. However, we must assume that a normal person has both senses and memory. A person perceives, and through his powers of perception, and with the help of his memory, he is able to arrive at notions of orderings, or relations (e.g relative position, etc) between some of the objects of his world. The notion of perception is unrestricted. Pain, taste, dreams, emotions — all that a person is conscious of, are perceptions. Besides this initial ordering, we assume, or rather admit, that this ‘raw material’ can be considered in a multitude of ways. These further considerations are, for the first part, speculative attempts at further orderings, attempts which give rise to all the philosophies, arts and scientific descriptions conceivable.

We assume the person, or rather the mind of the speculator, to be quite simple. That is, we assume that any particular person, although not lacking in intelligence or rationality, has only one manner of considering his perceptions. This assumption will allow us to develop the notion of a ‘pure’ or ‘classical’ scientist or artist, a person with, in some sense, a singular viewpoint. We have only to reflect on how each of us views a given notion in a different manner to substantiate this assumption.

We will use the term reference frame to denote a very general type of viewpoint. By so doing, we will be able to characterize the artist and the scientist each in a basic way, while still allowing different viewpoints to be held within the respective frame.

For example, different viewpoints can be held by different ‘pure’ scientists, all of whom, nevertheless, think within the same scientific ‘reference frame.’

Now we define the causal frame as the frame in which one searches for an understanding of their world in terms of explicit cause and effect relations between the basic events perceived.

We similarly define the implicit frame as the frame in which one searches for an understanding of their world, but does not require that his conceived relations be explicit relations.

We further define analytic and synthetic thought as the reasoning processes used in the causal and the implicit frames respectively.

With these definitions in mind we can now state our hypothesis:
     The causal viewpoint (or frame) is necessary to give rise to scientific thought and description.
     The implicit frame is necessary to give rise to artistic thought and description.

This is an interesting conjecture, for it implies that the reference frame limits one’s modes of thought about a subject, and that these limits are sufficient to explain the difference between the artist and the scientist. To what extent do these frames imply limits? And what are the consequences if one’s thoughts are so constrained? We will consider these questions for each frame independently.

However, before continuing, we should reemphasize the dependence of the arguments we will use, on our earlier assumptions. We assumed that a person in a particular frame only thinks with whatever freedom is allowable within that frame, and of course the person must be rational. The importance of assuming rationality is obvious, for the limits must be deduced from the premise. Therefore, the limits are logical limits, and so can be applicable only if the person considered reasons in a fashion that is logical, i.e. he is rationally constrained. This is assured if the person thinks only within the general frame and if the deduced limitations are fairly broad.

Consider now the causal frame. By definition, if one in it tries to understand an event, he will look for a cause and try to establish an explicit cause-and-effect explanation. We do not, by definition, limit either the events he can consider or the causes he can conceive.

Consider first, as the simplest case, a physically isolated person (i.e. mind) in a causal frame. The fellow may dwell as a hermit in a desert, or be a mystic living alone in the mountains. As a result, his knowledge of the world in which he lives consists only of that which he gleans for himself.

If he is only contemplative, his thoughts may lead him to an understanding, which in a broad sense is ‘religious.’ The mountains, trees, sky, grass around him, as well as dreams and visions (or hallucinations) can be linked by chains of thoughts and made purposeful, or meaningful under a cause of a God or gods.

But suppose this fellow, rather than stopping at the development of an all encompassing religion, wishes to test his ideas. If such and such is the cause of an event, can he reproduce the event by reproducing the cause as an event of yet another cause? What is the relation of a shadow to a stone? Move the stone. Does the shadow remain behind? A cloudy sky; no shadows. Or rather, perhaps, just shadows of the clouds covering all the earth. “For what we commonly call a shadow can be nothing but air deprived of light.”¹

If our fellow goes on and tries to understand the world, more or less from the ground up, he finds that one portion can be considered more easily than the other. If he thinks and tests within a casual frame, he becomes aware of subjective and objective events. The objective events comprise the portion that can be committed to testing.

Consider for a moment now, a chap who is much more sociable. He is aware of his own perceptions, and the perceptions described by those around him. Again, if he thinks within a causal frame, he becomes aware of subjective and objective events. He can test his own ideas, with much the same results as our long experimenter. He will find that some relations lend themselves to being tested, other events do not. This person can also accept a ‘religious’ teaching which explains the cause of all. But still, portions of the world remain subjective, others objective.

A person has seen a ghost, the father of his father, walking from his grave near the willow stand. Have others seen him? What is the cause of his appearance? Many explanations can be given, but still by no means can one prove its existence or cause its reappearance. And so the vision much be considered subjective.

The objective portion assumes a unique importance. ‘Reality’ becomes the set of perceptions that the majority of the people claim in common. It follows that a causal understanding of an event can be deemed to contain a correctness or truth, which in basis is just explicit agreement between many trials and observations.

Two severe limitations confront the causal thinker. First, truth, to him, depends on agreement and consistency within his reference frame, and agreement depends on testability and correlation. Therefore, he may tend to throw out as meaningless or unimportant, anything that is non-objective. He cannot understand what he cannot analyze and explicitly formulate. This indicates the second limitation: ‘truth’ must be limited to what is communicable, for if it is not, the formula is not yet explicit and understanding is not yet complete. We will consider these points more, when we consider artists and scientists explicitly.

However, can similar limitations be found for the implicit frame? By definition, in the implicit frame, the conceived relations (one’s understanding) do not need to be explicit relations.

At first, this definition seems to be much too general, for are not all relations either explicit or not explicit? Furthermore, if the first frame is associated with scientific thought, doesn’t such a general definition of an implicit frame, seem to define all non-scientists as artists?

In answer, the substitution of ‘not necessarily explicit’ is most general and necessary. Second, all non-scientists do not become defined as artists, since the implicit and causal frames are not sufficient to allow all possible basic viewpoints. The possibility of a third frame is apparent. One may consider a frame in which explicit relations are required, but which need not be causal in nature. Many philosophies can be placed in this frame. And it is in this frame that non-causal reasoning can give rise to the logic of mathematics. We will not develop the reasoning for this assertion at present. However, its plausibility is clear on reflection, and will be assumed to hold for later discussions in this paper.

Now, if we relax causality, we claim we can define the frame associated with mathematical logic. If we further relax the condition of explicitness, we reach the implicit frame of, we will show, the artist.

As before, our friend is not limited in this ‘raw material.’ All that he is conscious of is worthy of his consideration. We assume immediately that this person lives in society, or at least is aware of objectivity and subjectivity. However, all that he considers may attain equal importance in his understanding. Most importantly, emotions, which are subjective elements, remain as proper entities. Their basic nature remains undifferentiated from the elements the fellow in the causal frame considers as objective. A logical distinction of primary and secondary quantities does not exist.

The causal person can know love, sense beauty, feel pleasure with himself and his work. But these quantities are subjective, separate from that which he many explicitly order. If he tries to understand (in his sense of understanding) these former quantities, he can only do so by demonstrating that ‘happiness in a reaction: neurons, glands, stimulus create it.’ This he can understand, but happiness as a ‘truth’, as something explicit, existing in itself, of course not.

The person in the implicit frame is not so logically limited, or else he does not have such good, critical insight (depending on your own viewpoint).

If all of conscious sensation is ‘primary,’ how is understanding delineated? How is understanding expressed? And what is the ‘truth’ implied in the understanding?

Our implicit friend, upon climbing a hill, sees much the same view as our causal person. But besides the town, the road, the hills and beyond on to the mist and sky, he senses a mood, the spirit of the blues and haze and scattered light. This, to him, is a real part of what lays before him, and secondly, part of himself. If he is to understand anything, the understanding must also be of the spirit, the mood, the feeling invoked by the view.

Yes, the light is reframed by the dust and pollen. Yes, the shadows produce the strange patterns. But these explanations are not complete, for the refracted light, the shadows’ shapes do not explain the beauty of the melancholy mood I also perceive.